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management bodies that are more up-
wards accountable to the central state than 
downwards accountable to local communi-
ties. Devolution of powers to local branches 
of line ministries, appointed committees, 
nGos, and the private sector frequently 
occurs in the name of decentralisation. in 
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Decentralised forest management:  
a donors' darling
Decentralised forest management has in 
recent decades received increased attention 
from the governments of developing coun-
tries, usually as a response to donor advoc-
acy and support. Many developing countries 
are in the process of or have enacted poli-
cies and legislation that favour decentralised 
forest management and recent estimates 
indicate that more than one fifth of the de-
veloping world’s forests are subject to some 
form of such management (White and 
Martin 2002). however, this rapid spread of 
decentralised forest management frequently 
faces ambiguous support or outright resi-
stance from various actors in developing 
countries. this policy brief seeks to describe 
and analyse this apparent paradox. the aim 
is to offer donors guidance on how such 
ambiguities may be managed through good 
policy design, support to civil society organi-
sations and independent research. 
How does resistance to decentralised 
forest management manifest itself?
Decentralised forest management has 
become a popular development strategy 
because it is expected to promote resource 
conservation and an equitable distribution 
of forest related benefits due to improved 
efficiency and accountability in forest ma-
nagement processes. however, turning this 
theoretical potential into reality requires 
that real decentralisation takes place, i.e. 
that meaningful and discretionary powers 
are devolved to downwards accountable 
management bodies (ribot 2004). 
resistance to decentralised forest manage-
ment in developing countries usually entails 
some part(s) of the central state. central 
states often prefer devolving powers to 
this way, central states actually retain con-
trol over decentralised forest management 
bodies thus reducing the likelihood of de-
centralisation benefits materialising at local 
level (ribot et al. 2006). such ambiguity in 
decentralisation policy has been observed, 
among other places, in cambodia where 
Decentralised forest management as a means to improve rural livelihoods, conserve 
forest resources and promote good governance is officially promoted through poli-
cies and legislation by many developing countries
yet, the majority of decentralised forest management processes often face resistance 
by different actors within the administrative and political realms of these countries
in dealing with these ambiguities, donors should avoid pursuing overly ambitious 
policies and combine support to official decentralisation processes with support to 
civil society organisations and research that may challenge articulated and hidden 
resistance against or overly optimistic support of decentralised forest management in 
national policy arenas
Policy Conclusions
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decentralised forest management has re-
mained at the policy formulation stage whi-
le actual implementation is still to happen 
(ifsr 2004). the cambodian central state 
contains multiple contradictory interests, 
some of which are represented by a rather 
autonomous military, and it appears dif-
ficult to establish a broad consensus about 
promotion of decentralised management 
(sunderlin 2006). 
even when powers are actually devolved 
to local downwards accountable manage-
ment bodies, the benefits of decentralised 
management may be curtailed in numerous 
ways. often, local communities receive 
rights to degraded areas with potential for 
appropriation of subsistence use products 
only, while rights to areas with more lucra-
tive commercial prospects remain within the 
domain of central states to be sold off as 
concessions, as is the case in Mozambique 
(lund and Mustalahti 2007) and uganda 
(bazaara 2003). alternatively, only low va-
lue or highly depleted forest resources are 
decentralised. technical requirements to 
management may also be so complicated 
that local communities become totally de-
pendent on forestry officials to comply with 
rules and regulations. When local commu-
nities gain substantial powers over valuable 
forest resources, central governments may 
still re-capture commercial benefits through 
rules and regulations that influence the 
profitability and hence the incentive to ma-
naging forests at the local level. licensing 
systems, taxation legislation, and regula-
tion of forest products transport and trade 
by ministerial decrees are widely applied 
techniques. forest revenues are captured 
either directly through taxes and fees or 
indirectly through patronage systems and 
unofficial payments to officials that thrive 
in the shade of distorted markets created 
by ill-informed or ill-intended functional 
forest law. a recent example from tanzania 
illustrates how central government through 
issuing a decree creates obstacles to de-
centralised forest management, which is 
a policy that the government has strongly 
promoted in policies and legislation (see 
box 1). 
the observed ambiguities in developing 
countries’ approach to decentralised forest 
management can also be analysed from the 
perspective of the state being a multifarious 
creature, with actors at various levels having 
different and often competing interests. 
from this perspective, overall explanations 
of resistance against decentralised forest 
management appear to include:
 personal economic interests of various 
actors
 political struggles over turf and resources
 problematic donor behaviour
personal economic interests of administra-
tors, politicians and other powerful actors 
at various levels are important underlying 
reasons for ambiguous responses to de-
centralised forest management. in many 
developing countries, the forest sector is 
renowned for its culture of patronage and 
rather formalised systems of corrupt practi-
ces, which create special interests in relation 
to the regulation of forest management and 
trade in forest products (treue 2001, ama-
cher 2006). 
even where patronage is not the primary 
problem, forests are important sources of 
revenue and political turf for government 
administrators and politicians. accordingly, 
forest policy easily becomes an arena of 
power struggles whenever changes in con-
trol of forest resources and revenues hit 
the political agenda. these tendencies are 
expressed in the exclusive focus on degra-
ded areas for the implementation of de-
centralised forest management in uganda 
and Mozambique, and also appear in the 
apparent lack of interest in the concept by 
forest revenue dependent district councils in 
tanzania (blomley 2006).
finally, problematic donor behaviour may 
be an important underlying reason for resi-
since the early 1990s, tanzania has pursued decentralised forest management through 
enactment of highly supportive policies and legislation and a concerted donor effort to 
support national implementation measures that has resulted in approximately 10% of 
tanzania’s forests being under decentralised management by 2006 (blomley 2006). 
following a severe drought in 2005, however, all harvesting, transport and trade in forest 
products was suddenly banned through a ministerial decree. this implied an over-night 
removal of the more than 1,000 village governments’ discretionary powers over forest 
resources. the ban was lifted after a number of months when an amendment to the 
forest regulations made new, centrally appointed district level committees responsible for 
coordinating forest products harvesting by allocation production areas, including forest 
areas under village government jurisdiction (urt 2006). hence, the village governments’ 
recently established jurisdiction over forest resources has de facto been re-centralised in a 
top-down fashion with no formal avenues of appeal.
Box 1: Forest re-centralisation in Tanzania through decrees 
stance against decentralised forest manage-
ment. the policy of decentralised forest 
management inherently carries the notion 
that centralised management has somehow 
failed. either forest resources have declined 
despite official goals of the opposite or the 
cost of their management has exceeded 
officially collected forest revenues, or both. 
nevertheless, forest administrations ge-
nerally find it difficult to accept that local 
communities, which are often perceived as 
part of ‘the problem’ should be better forest 
managers than professional foresters. hen-
ce, if donors push decentralised forest ma-
nagement too hard, central state agencies 
may consider them exponents of a hidden 
agenda to drastically downsize or eliminate 
them. accordingly, intended partnerships 
in development sometimes turn into ‘policy 
games’ between donors and recipients 
who pretend to share a common vision but 
actually disagree fundamentally on the ap-
propriateness of promoting decentralised 
forest management. if unresolved, such 
pretended consensus inevitably ends in con-
frontation and possible discontinuation of 
the collaboration, which leaves communities 
in pilot areas as the real losers. laos appears 
to be such a case where a promising pilot 
phase of decentralised forest management 
during the late 1990s was followed by a 
more centralised approach with far less 
benefits to involved local communities 
from 2003 onwards (sunderlin 2006). the 
solution to such predicaments can only be 
found in committed cooperation between 
recipient countries and donors. yet, donors’ 
policies are often shaped by current interna-
tional development trends and, in the case 
of bilateral agencies, domestic aid policies 
(Mosse 2004). accordingly, donor organi-
paGe 2 pol icy br ief  no.  1  /  2007 
sations may face restrictions in pursuing 
compromise models of decentralised forest 
management that are acceptable to both 
recipient countries and their own govern-
ment and parliament. 
How can donors promote and coun-
teract resistance to decentralised forest 
management at the same time?
Donors should avoid overly ambitious po-
licies in terms of what decentralised forest 
management should entail from the outset. 
some donors and scholars express disap-
pointment when central governments are 
reluctant to decentralise large tracts of 
commercially valuable forests (sunderlin 
2006). yet, seen from the perspective of 
resource constrained line ministries and 
local governments there may be perfectly 
good reasons for their concerns, which have 
little to do with protecting special interests. 
rather, donors should identify which degree 
of decentralisation is politically possible and 
then push/support a swift handing over of 
management authority to as much forest 
as soon as possible. the objective being to 
establish the foundation for forest rights ba-
sed civil society movements with sufficient 
membership-mass to effectively use demo-
cratic means of maintaining and enhancing 
rights to forest resources and revenues. the 
point is that, in addition to assisting official 
agencies, strong donor presence and align-
ment during the early phase of implemen-
tation should kick-start a process towards 
formation of advocacy groups, which can 
pursue their members’ interests on the na-
tional policy stage. 
Whether decentralisation of forest ma-
nagement is pursued through devolution 
of powers to democratically elected local 
governments (as in tanzania) or delegation 
of powers to self-forming forest user groups 
(as in nepal) appear of little practical rele-
vance. it is probably more important to use 
windows of opportunity to initiate the pro-
cess and support the establishment of ma-
nagement bodies that are downwards ac-
countable, receive meaningful powers and 
rights that cannot be arbitrarily removed by 
the state. Moreover, donors should support 
these management bodies to become capa-
ble of advocating their cause in the national 
policy arena. no system of decentralised 
management will be perfect from the out-
set and the central state should in any case 
seek to prevent or correct inequities and 
assure environmental standards. such in-
tervention may be (ab)used to re-centralise 
rather than improve the social and environ-
mental outcomes of decentralised forest 
management, but this is an inescapable fea-
ture of any decentralisation process.
to promote democratic decentralisation, 
donors should identify and support grass-
root movements and nGos that can take a 
leading role in policy advocacy for decentra-
lised forest management. this has proven its 
worth in nepal, where a proposed amend-
ment to the forest act, which would re-cen-
tralise control over community forests, was 
met with fierce popular resistance (see box 
2 next page). 
the final means, through which donors can 
support decentralised forest management 
and promote democratic decision-making is 
through supporting independent research. 
Decentralisation is hardly a panacea to su-
stainable forest management and should 
always be critically assessed. yet, as argued 
by ribot (2004) among others, predictions 
of decentralisation leading to uncontrollable 
forest clearance or gross inequalities are 
frequently voiced. in the absence of credible 
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and well-documented information on how 
decentralised forest management works in 
practice and over the long term, such nega-
tive claims as well as their positive opposi-
tes, are impossible to refute or substantiate. 
hence, independent research is needed to 
inform the public debate and political deci-
sion-makers. 
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following 20 years of community forestry, the forest management by nepalese commu-
nities had turned large areas of previously degraded government forest into valuable 
resources. in 2001, the central government proposed an amendment to the 1997 forest 
act, which would re-centralise much control over community forests and impose a 40% 
taxation of profits arising from products sold outside forest managing communities  
(chhetri 2001). 
this amendment bill was, however, met by strong popular resistance organised by the 
federation of forest user Groups nepal (fecofun) and communicated through the free 
media as well as large protest demonstrations outside the parliament in Kathmandu. 
furthermore, fecofun raised and won a supreme court case against the state where 
fecofun opposed the 40% tax to be collected by district forest officers (nsc 2003). 
Due to the recent years’ political turmoil in nepal, the amendment bill is still pending in 
parliament, but the strong and professionally articulated popular resistance has definitely 
had an impact and showed how decentralised forest management can serve to promote 
bottom-up democratisation.
Box 2: Re-centralisation in Nepal countered by poæular resistance 
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important development issues. Readers are en-
couraged to make reference to the Briefs in their 
own publications, and to quote from them with 
due acknowledgement of the source.  
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of Copenhagen (FLD) and the Danish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (Danida). The brief draws on vari-
ous FLD research projects on decentralised forest 
management in Cambodia, Ghana, Laos, Nepal, 
and Tanzania. 
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